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On violence by Walter 
Benjamin
Marco Antonio Vélez Vélez*
Walter Benjamin’s essay For a Critique of Violence was written at an early stage in the author’s life, he 
was 29 years old. Its context is that of the first postwar period, the triumph of the Russian revolution, the 
defeat of the German revolution in 1919 and the death of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, and the 
publication of the Georg Sorel´s text with the title of Reflections on violence, (Sorel, 1978), this means, a 
chaotic social and political situation. It was a time of transition from bourgeois to socialist revolutions 
with the possibility of the realization of utopia. Violence was then an everyday-topic. Violence of war, 
but also revolutionary violence, apart from daily violence, was persistent and permanent among human 
beings. Unlike Sorel’s text, there was no precedent for a critical discourse on the subject of violence. 
Revolutionary violence had been prevalent topic, but in an instrumental perspective of overthrowing the 
bourgeois state by the forces of the proletariat.
Marx, Engels, and Lenin had shown the instrumental character of revolutionary violence without 
turning it into an object of critical inquiry. State violence was the object of sociological thinking in 
texts such as those of Max Weber, who proclaimed that the violence of the State was legitimate as 
an undisputed monopoly of this, and at the same time as a guarantee of social order. Why reflect 
on violence at that precise moment? What makes violence an issue of a topic par excellence so that 
Benjamin makes it the source of his concerns? There is something that exceeds in violence, something, 
beyond its normal effects, that given the events cited, make it a privileged subject of analysis.
But for Benjamin, violence does not appear alone as a subject of inquiry or object of criticism; it is 
also linked to law and justice. Likewise, the combination of means and ends defines it in its possible 
theorizing. The legitimate and the legal, the sanctioned and the unapproved are other oppositional 
terms from which it can be evaluated, judged, parameterized. Dialectic of opposites preside Benjamin’s 
reflection on it. A common place is to put violence in the field of means. It would be the instrument for the 
achievement of ends that, if they are just, they just endorse it. Justice as infinity serves as an insurance 
for its exercise. But it is not only the common sense that says so. It is a branch of law, of the philosophy 
of law, where it is derived from: natural law. Just natural purposes give validation to a violence used to 
pursue this infinity (Derrida, 1991). The examples presented by Benjamin to illustrate this conception 
are: the terror of the French revolution, pre-contractual violence and social Darwinism. In the first case, 
violence emanates naturally from the revolutionary event, from the enthusiasm it arouses. It is a means 
to overthrow the injustice of an oppressive regime even at the risk of generating a new oppression. The 
pre-contractual of violence refers to the classic theories of the social contract that consider it as the 
just instrument to eradicate the condition of war or the confrontation of all against all. The contract, as 
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an instance of law, apparently produces peace as a guarantee of what is just. Social Darwinism is the 
justification of violence as the instrument of the strongest to impose its interests and desires. From 
there it can be justified as a domination that would find its reasoning from the certainty or factum of the 
nature. The natural law of what is just seems to regulate the reasoning or factum of violence exercised 
in the name of law, that is inscribed in nature.
There is a symbol of nature that allows us to know the use of violence as justified. Why not resort 
to this argument about the natural legitimacy of violence to the revolutionary fact already existing for 
Benjamin, the Russian revolution? This shows perhaps the political ambiguity of the young Benjamin, for 
whom the militant socialist commitment was not so necessary for the intellectual thinker; this ambiguity 
of Benjamin´s political thought was testified by his French biographer, Bruno Takels. In 1926 he will visit 
Moscow due to the invitation of a Bolshevik militant, Asja Lacis, which will better define his political 
nexus with militant Marxism. In any case, as we know from the historians of the October Revolution, this 
was not characterized by a large outpouring of blood. The Tsarist troops, their soldiers, had made the 
mental turn to Bolshevism, which saved many deaths, as the historians of that revolution have pointed 
out. One might judge the Stalinist thermidor with the parameter of violence, now totalitarian, but this will 
be a matter of the future by the time Benjamin wrote his essay.
If we look at the issue of violence from the philosophy of positive law, Benjamin tells us, this 
guarantees the justice of the ends from the legitimacy of the means. The thematization is slipping here 
towards the slope of legitimate violence. This, the positive law, allows in turn a distinction between 
types of violence, types to be valued and judged and not only evaluated from their use. Positive law 
would require a historical recognition of the types of violence that would demand the denial of violence 
in the pursuit of personal ends. The individual legal subject is excluded from the use of violence for 
his own purposes. But the ends of law start from the recognition of the monopoly of violence by the 
State. And if it’s about types, Benjamin begins with the case of the criminal transgressor of the law. This 
becomes popular and arouses admiration to uncover the violence of the law against individuals, which 
in a way he puts in question. Another type is the accepted violence of the general strike.
Although Benjamin admits here that there is more a phenomenon of inaction that can lead to violent 
exercise against the employer, but there, the legitimate response of the State monopolizing violence will 
not be delayed. The violent contradiction between strikers and the State is a practical contradiction; one 
form of violence responds to another. Warlike violence, another of the Benjaminian types, becomes a 
founding violence of new law. Within the right of war, Benjamin considers military violence as violence 
for the purpose of law, since it seeks to guarantee the conscription of the citizen as an act of obedience 
to compulsory military service. The State forces the citizen to exercise the violence that is considered 
in accordance with the law.
Institute a right or conserving a right; in the field of military service and the law of war emerges this 
double function of violence. The violence of conscription is conservative law violence and Benjamin says 
that to reject it is simply to display “childish anarchism.” An objectionable position, because according 
to this, the current movements of conscientious objection to militarism would lack justification and 
validity, since they could be standards of mere desire, when we know that by historical experience these 
movements are a source of resistance to the purposes of the law of the Rule of law.
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Anti-militarism rescues the natural ends as an exercise of non-violence by the person. If it passes to 
the Kantian categorical imperative, Benjamin’s objection is put in perspective of the little demand that 
arises there; the other as an end and never as a means. But the instrumentality of the other will always 
be an open possibility, much more in a market regime and instrumental rationality. Positive law would 
formally guard the interests of all mankind, but what should be evaluated is the validity of the legal order 
as a whole and not as a singularity of one or another law. On the other hand, the violence exercised by 
an order of law through the death penalty, as a right of sovereignty, would present the evidence of the 
violence of order itself in how much violence that install the law as a whole. The sovereign power is a 
power that asserts in the privilege of life and death, its greater fulfillment as a form of power. Hence the 
commutation of capital punishment is a sign of the very arbitrariness of the sovereign itself. This avails 
to the exception. The State can exempt the criminal from his responsibility to the right order, against 
the founding violence.
Finally, the police as a modern institution is a mixture in the worst way of the founder and conservative 
violence. The police overflows the limits of the founding and conservative right. It, aside from going 
beyond the legal purposes of the Legal State, establishes new provisions guaranteed by the care of so-
called security. Preserving the security of the law forces the police to overrun the right; “their violence 
is devoid of form” (Benjamin 1991: 32). Violence reports to ensure the subsistence of the rule of law 
and the purposes of law. In this context, it is worthwhile to consider another form of approach to the 
phenomenon of police in modernity, and it is the case of the biopolitical conception in Foucault; for the 
French author, the police emerges in the positivity and productivity of modern power, it breaks out as a 
producer of general welfare, at least in the original intention of the institution. Benjamin, on the other 
hand, evaluates it as a parameter of the exercise of violence.
Parliaments would be another proof of the neglect of the role of founding violence of law. They arise 
in the context of the historical claims of a new class, whose power of convening and activating centers 
of utopia would already have been lost at the beginning of the twentieth century. The Bolshevik critique 
of parliamentarism would show the decline of an institution only supported by conservative violence.
But, will a non-violent resolution of human conflicts be possible, asks the German author. The 
answer is positive. And it resorts to the ethical means called a “culture of the heart,” which in today’s 
language would be something like a civil ethic appealing to resources such as courtesy, love of peace, 
and trust; a culture whose common expression is that of the conversation as a linguistic medium of 
understanding with the other. Habermas would say: a field of speech acts with its claims of validity, 
verifiable, performative and expressive. Everyday speech is a domain for non-violent understanding 
among humans. A community of communication is outlined here.
This customary sense of non-violence is used to show that the face of law has as counterpart non-
violent speech, in this case, the ordinary, everyday, and that of the conversation. On the other hand, 
the non-criminalization of lying and deceit in premodern conditions would show another dimension 
of language, beyond punishment and guilt. The issue to be deciphered is: what do we communicate 
in everyday conversation that would make it nonviolent? In everyday communication we use language 
as a sign, which is as a capacity for meaning referred not to the basic incommunicability of things, 
but to the communicability of intersubjectivity in the spiritual level among human beings. The basic 
20
Marco Antonio Vélez Vélez
rev. univ. catol. luis amigó | No. 1 | enero-diciembre | 2017 
DOI: http://
communicability of human language allows us to communicate in the intersubjectivity in the spiritual 
level. We can lie and cheat, that is, making a performative use of language. There, non-understanding 
does not appear, but in principle, non-understanding can harbor the power of violence, so there will be 
no non-violent safeguard in everyday language. These reflections are supported by the Banjaminian text 
of 1916, On the language in general and on the language of men.
Playing with oppositional pairs in this writing of Benjamin, a last contradiction emerges, comes to 
light. It is the opposition between mythical and divine violence. Mythical violence is destiny and is a 
founder of right, i.e., founder of power. Fate meets here the role of law as an exercise of violence of the 
gods on the men. Greek violence says Derrida. Divine violence is destructive of right, its immediacy has 
the form of redemption. Mythical violence lay bare life (Giorgio Agamben) in the field of the Atonement, 
then, says Benjamin (1991), the right is domain on the bare life, on the physiological life, Zoe and not 
Bios.
Divine violence has also the ethical imperative of the “no killing” that get in the way of the transgressor 
that seek to authorize a death on behalf of the bare existence, putting in question the life of the tyrant who 
may be sacrificed. His text ends Benjamin with an invocation to the overcoming of the mythical founder 
of right violence and conservative violence of right that is nothing more than repetition. It is “divine 
violence, logo and seal, never sacred execution environment, could be called, the reigning” (Benjamin, 
1991), that is, she would be the expression of a clean, pure, violence very symbol of redemption. And 
yet, this pure violence seems to be beyond human, both in its dimension of Zoe, as Bios.
For Miriam Jerade (2007), commentator of the Benjaminian text, mythical violence opens the 
possibility of the exercise of revolutionary violence, i.e., a messianic time, “time which would not be 
resumed, but redemption of the past by the memory of oppression” (p. 21); emerges a Jetzeit, a now-
time of historical discontinuity in the activation of a violence that would be so revolutionary, founding 
and opening to a justice as infinity. A time of redemption, such which was put in the emblematic text–
and perhaps the central thought of the author-the concept of history heritage; time that enhances the 
infinitude of the not straight or at least one expurgated Justice of violence. Redemption not to invoke 
the unique salvific, subject himself to violence, where this sacrificial scapegoat much. Revolutionary 
violence is sacrificial in another way, puts into play the gift of the subject on the altar of emancipation. 
In it, the sacrifice of the singular everyday makes possible not only the donation of their bare life, but 
also the loss of the multiplicity of de lives, for life as bios may arise in fullness.
Revolutionary violence happens beyond the law, she interrupts as Foundation and conservation law. 
This anomie in now the processing time, the performativity of the subject makes law, a new law. A law 
under the signature of the justice, as a basic virtue of the social order. A law seeking the immanence, 
but maintaining its significance in light of the history of the revolutions.
The subject is at the gates of the law, according to the Kafkaesque text before the law is the law 
for them, a singular-universal law, doors have always been open. The subject the prelude to the story 
and make history, even at the risk that the door will close, before a new subduing experience. The 
guardians of the entries are the potential of a new domain, now with no judgement. In the events of the 
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revolutionary violence emerges as law, just as a redemption of the past, dissociates the historical debt 
of the oppressed and the “weak messianic force” returns, as the author tells us in his text in 1940, on 
the concept of history.
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